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Is This Really About What We Call Our Food or
Something Else? The WTO Food Name Case
over the Protection of Geographical
Indications
LISA BENCH NIEUWVELD*
The European Union's Regulation 2081/92, which came out in 1992, only further spurred
the existing heated debate between the European Union and the United States. This paper
seeks to analyze the respective countries' systems which regulate both trademarks and geo-
graphical indications to reveal why the debate exists, concluding that national market preser-
vation, i.e. economics, is the driving force. In other words, it boils down to an argument not
between the old adage of North versus South, but, instead, Old World versus New World.
I. Introduction
The European Union's Regulation 2081/92, which came out in 1992, only further
spurred the existing heated debate between the European Union and other countries,
namely the United States. In this paper, I seek to analyze the respective countries' systems
which regulate both trademarks and geographical indications (GIs) to reveal why the de-
bate exists. I further intent to compare how the respective parties handle GIs in hopes of
determining the true stimulator behind this debate.
Section II gives a brief overview of the economic theory driving trademarks and GIs,
the asymmetric information theory and how these relate to protectionism. This demon-
strates the social problem the law attempts to solve-protecting consumers. Section III
will briefly describe the World Trade Organization (WTO). Section IV will define both a
GI and a trademark. Section V gives a detailed explanation of the U.S. trademark system.
Section VI gives a detailed analysis of the European Community (EC) trademark. Section
VII analyzes the WTO Panel's final decision and both the United States' and the EU's
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claim to have achieved a victory in this decision. Section VIII points out important impli-
cations behind this argument, and, finally, the paper concludes with section IX.
The conclusion states that it is truly national market preservation, i.e. economics, which
drives this debate. The United States wants to allow its constituents full EU access, and
the EU wants to protect its farmers and producers from the future effects that globaliza-
tion may have on countries not sufficiently competitive. It boils down to an argument not
between the old adage of North versus South, but, instead, Old World versus New World.
The Old World, striving to maintain global competitiveness and global market share
wants to recapture the names of old; names which old immigrants took with them to the
new countries, or, in other words, the New World. Today, hundreds of years later, in
some cases, these names and images are well-established and no longer create the same
association they may have had before all the colonization occurred. In other words, this
analysis concludes, it is too late.
H. Economics
A. THEORY DRIVING TRADEMARKs & GIs
In George Akerlof's widely acclaimed 1970 article,I Akerlof explains the economic the-
ory behind trademarks and GIs. It is important to understand why a country, arguably in
favor of open competition, without protecting certain markets, would allow businesses to
own certain names which they associate with their products. These property rights, which
are further defined below, can merely associate a random term or symbol with a com-
pany's product or indicate from which geographical region the product originates.
Akerlof's economic theory involves asymmetrical information in which an imbalance
exists as to the quality of goods sold and whether the buyer or the seller has more knowl-
edge on the product's level of quality. 2 In theory, the seller presumably knows better the
condition and quality of the product sold. He knows whether or not he is selling a lemon
or a good quality product. The buyer, however, does not know and pays the same for a
lemon as he would for a good product because there is no way to distinguish between the
lemons and the good products.3 Once the buyer leaves with the product and uses it for a
period of time, he presumably acquires more information than the seller as to whether or
not this particular product is in fact a lemon. This imbalance of information is known as
asymmetrical information in Akerlof's article.4 Therefore, the main resulting problem is
that ultimately the good quality products may be driven out of the market by the cheaper
but lower quality products.
A perfect example that Akerlof uses involves the costs of dishonesty.5 In this situation,
the market is composed of goods which are sold either honestly or dishonestly.6 The
1. George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J.
ECON. 488 (1970).
2. Id. at 489.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 489, 490-492. Obviously, Akerlof goes into more economic depth using statistical equations to
explain his theory.
5. Id. at 495-496.
6. Id.
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seller may accurately represent the product's quality or simply misrepresent it. 7 Unfortu-
nately, the buyer cannot know for certain the product's actual quality.8 There may be a
potential market of sellers with good products priced at the same range as buyers wanting
those good products, but the misrepresented deals can drive out the good deals. 9 There-
fore, the cost of dishonesty is not just the loss of quality to the unfortunate buyer of a
misrepresented product, but also the cost of loss to good businesses driven out of the
market.' 0
As such, countries have a legitimate interest in offering at least some protection to those
conducting legitimate businesses within their boundaries. This is true, not just for the
sake of the businesses, but also for consumer protection. That is where this theory comes
into play for trademarks and GIs. Akerlof mentions this application briefly when he dis-
cusses brand-names as an institution's method for counteracting quality uncertainty's ef-
fects.II Brand names give buyers a means of distinguishing good and poor qualities
amongst products. 12 Should the product prove a lemon, buyers will avoid purchasing
from that seller again. 13 They may even go so far as to avoid purchasing other products,
different from the type which resulted in being a lemon, from that particular seller. 14
Trademarks offer that same protection. Manufacturers or sellers of goods or providers
of services work hard to create a reputation based on the particular name or symbol associ-
ated with their products or services. It is easy to assume that substantial amounts of in-
vestment are sunk into marketing such trade names for their products. This assists
businesses in ensuring that buyers, satisfied with the price-quality match the seller has
created, will become repeat customers. Trademarks are actively recognized and protected
in both the United States and the EU, as well as in several countries world-wide. They,
therefore, serve the function of protecting both the consumers from the likelihood of
confusion and the investment of businesses in their products and marketing.
Although GIs are protected in the EU and not in the United States, the same economic
theory applies, allowing consumers to associate these goods with their actual geographical
source and, possibly, the processing method.
Therefore, the lemon theory is directly applicable to both trademarks and GIs. They
grant product sellers a level of protection in the market against lemon sellers, allowing for
a relevant price discrepancy between the good and bad sellers based upon the product's
quality and trademark name association. They also protect buyers by allowing them to
have a higher informational level as to the type of product they are buying based on the
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B. PROTECTIOMSM
In essence, isn't granting such rights protectionism? Possibly, but some countries con-
sider such measures as justifiable. They allow it to incite businesses to compete and to
protect consumers from lemon sellers.
A protectionist is "an advocate of government economic protection for domestic pro-
ducers through restrictions on foreign competitors." 15 Protectionism is the actual imposi-
tion of these trade restrictions. However, not all trade restrictions result in protectionism,
as some may even assist or benefit trade.
Why is protectionism such an offensive word in trade circles? In the short term, it can
truly help protect a country's market. But, in the long term such actions can cause other
countries to retaliate and it can also harm the consumers. 16
As the conclusion will show, the United States and the EU are fighting over the extent
of protection that GIs should receive because protecting trademarks benefits American
companies and protecting GIs benefits those within the EU. Intellectual property rights
may have an economic basis to enjoy a measure of protection, but the respective countries
were attempting to take it further than allowed. The legal backdrop each country gives in
protecting these property rights is defined next, beginning with the relevant international
treaties and subsequently focusing narrowly on the nation's own trademark and GI pro-
tection laws.
C. FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENCE
The basic principle utilized in comparative law is that of functional equivalence.'7 Be-
low is a review of the respective trademark and geographical legal systems within the EU
and the United States and an attempt to understand why the WTO dispute truly came
about. "In law, the only things which are comparable are those which fulfill the same
function."I8 Therefore, this paper intends to demonstrate that both the EU and the
United States' laws fulfill the same function: they protect the consumers from buying
lemon products. Then why did the dispute arise? It arose because, although trying to
protect their consumers, the countries were also protecting their own markets. In order
to do this, the next few sections provide a review of the international arena binding both
political powers as well as their own internal legal systems before discussing the case itself.
III. WTO & TRIPS AGREEMENT
The WTO is the only international organization which governs trade rules between
nations.' 9 It is the successor to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
which originated from the 1930s; a time in which countries increasingly created trade
15. Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, www.m-w.com/dictionary/protectionist.
16. World Trade Organization, 10 Benefits of the WTO Trading System, www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/
whatise/1Oben-e/1Obo Ie.htn.
17. ZIW-ICERr & H. KoTx, AN IN-RODUCTION TO COMPARATIVF LAW, 34 (Tony Weir trans., 3d ed.,
Oxford Univ. Press 1996).
18. Id.
19. WTO, svpra note 16.
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barriers as a form of protectionism for their own markets and industries. 211 The GATT
originated as an a la carte trade organization, allowing members to pick and choose which
treaties to sign.2' Between 1986 and 1994, a time of intense negotiations, the GATT was
reconstructed, and in 1994, the WTO came into being. 22 Unlike the GAIT's a la carte
method, the WTO is an all or nothing membership. 23 When a country joins, it must
accept and abide by all the agreements therein. It also agrees to handle any trade disputes
through the WTO's trade dispute resolution board.24
The Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights of 1994
(TRIPS Agreement) falls under the WTO umbrella of agreements resulting from the
Uruguay Round. 25 The TRIPS Agreement is the primary relevant agreement because its
provisions were used to bring the dispute before the WTO panel.
In considering the other relevant treaties which bind the WTO countries and define
further the trademark and GI concepts, one must note that some of these agreements
originated prior to the WTO's initial creation. However, they have been incorporated as
one of the binding multilateral agreements. Therefore, the WTO members must comply
with their rules.
IV. What Are GIs Versus Trademarks and How They Protected?
GIs protect products that use a name associated with its place of origin. The World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) defines GIs as: "[A] sign used on goods that
have a specific geographical origin and possess qualities or a reputation that are due to that
place of origin."26
GIs fulfill two main functions: (1) they promote products which have certain character-
istics distinctive to that particular region, and (2) they assist consumers in identifying the
specific product amongst an increasingly diverse market. 27 GIs encompass appellations of
origin, indications of source and trademarks containing a geographic source. 28 GIs are
similar to trademarks in that they are a mark or symbol identifying the product, but they
differ because they do not identify the commercial enterprise attached to the product.29
Instead, they identify the region in which the product was made, grown or developed. 3()
In Europe, where GIs mainly originated, these are mostly associated with agricultural
products. Unlike the European Community (EC), the United States protects these under
their general trademark law.3 1 In contrast, the EC protects them separately. 32 The dis-
20. Id.





26. World Intellectual Property Organization, About Geographical Indications, http://www.wipo.int/
about-ip/en/about-geographical-ind.html(last visited February 14, 2005).
27. FREDFRICK ABBOI-I, TiO,-oAs CO-FFIER & FRANcIs GURRY, THE LF-rEPRNA'IIONAL INELLECTUAL
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tinctions between these two legal systems create the debate at hand and their respective
systems are discussed further below.
What exactly is a trademark? The TRIPS Agreement incorporates the Paris Conven-
tion by reference and gives the following trademark definition: "Any sign, or any combi-
nation of signs, capable of distinguishing the goods or services of one undertaking from
those of another undertaking, shall be capable of constituting a trademark." 33 Trademarks
are designed to grant consumers protection against similar products lacking the same
quality and to grant companies the ability to invest in brand awareness and protect against
third parties exploiting this brand awareness.
It appears that the two definitions of GIs and trademarks overlap between all the trea-
ties. GIs can fall within the broader trademark definition as a "sign . . . capable of distin-
gnishing the goods or services . . . from those of another."
34
V. U.S. Trademark System
A. CONTINTUATION OF TRADEMARK DEFINITION
The purpose behind trademark law is to identify both the sources of products and to
attest to the products' quality associated with its source. 35 What creates a trademark is
very broad and generic. The sign must never be functional and it must not be commonly
used for another purpose in society. 36 There are both goods and service trademarks. 37
Goods trademarks appear on products themselves or in connection with marketing the
sale of specified products. 38 However, service marks are associated with the operation of
particular services, such as hotels, airlines, banks, etc. 39 Protection is determined by the
strength of the mark. This in turn depends on the classification of the mark as either (1)
arbitrary, (2) descriptive, (3) suggestive, or (4) generic. Arbitrary or fanciful marks bear no
relationship whatsoever to the products they describe. 40 These are the strongest. Sugges-
tive marks suggest a product in people's minds while descriptive marks describe the prod-
uct or service offered.4 1 However, generic marks are so associated with a particular
product class that they have become the natural way to refer to that type of product, and,
therefore, are not typically eligible for protection.
The functionality doctrine prevents trademark law, which seeks to promote competi-
tion by protecting a firm's reputation, from prohibiting legitimate competition by al-
lowing a producer to control a useful product feature. A product is functional, and thus
cannot serve as a trademark, if it is essential to the use or purpose of the article or if it
32. Id.
33. Id. (referencing TRIPS Agreement Article 15.1 and Paris Convention Article 2.1).
34. Id.
35. ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENNELL, & MARK A. LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN TIHE
NEw TECHNOLOGICiAL AGE 182 (3d ed. 2003).
36. Id. at 182.
37. Id.
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affects the cost or quality of the article; that is, if exclusive use of the feature would put
competitors at a significant non-reputation-related disadvantage.
Trademarks perform four main functions: (1) To help consumer distinguish products of
one company from another; (2) To associate the mark with a particular quality, protecting
investment in labor and capital; (3) To identify the product with its producer; and (4) To
promote marketing and sales of the associated products and services.
42
These traditional trademark registration purposes form the foundation of the three le-
gal requirements in the United States to register a trademark. A word or symbol may
become a registered trademark where it is a (1) symbol, (2) used . . . as a mark, (3) to
identify and distinguish the seller's goods from goods made or sold by others, but it may
not be functional. 43
B. ESTABLISHING TRADEMARK RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES
In 1946, the current legislation over trademarks came into place as the Lanham Act.
Under this act, the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office maintains a register of trademarks,
allowing the owner to enforce its rights against those infringing the mark.
1. Distinctiveness
When a trademark is immediately capable of identifying a unique product source, rights
to the mark are determined solely by priority of use."4 Marks such as these are labeled
"inherently distinctive," though, for analytical completeness they are further subdivided
into arbitrary, fanciful, and suggestive marks. 45 For all other trade marks the Lanham Act
requires proof of an additional element to secure trademark rights: secondary meaning.
46
The most important type of word or symbol requiring secondary meaning is the descrip-
tive trademark.
In Zatarain's Inc. v. Oak Grove Smoke House, Inc.,47 the court addressed the issue of
whether there was an infringement of two trademarks (Fish-Fri and Chick-Fri). The
court defined a generic term as the name of a particular genus or class of which an individ-
ual article or service is but a member.48 It reflects the basic nature of the items rather than
the more individualized characteristics of a particular product. They can never attain
trademark protection. and if a term ever becomes generic, the mark's registration can be
cancelled. 49 The court looked to a descriptive term as an identifying characteristic or
quality, such as color, odor, function, dimensions, or ingredients, which can normally not
be protected as trademarks.511 However, they may become valid marks if they acquire a
secondary meaning in the public's mind.51
42. Id. at 129-130.
43. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTltY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COIPETrTION, §§ 3.01[l], 7.26
44. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b)( 3)( D).
45. Leatherware Co. v. Ann Taylor, Inc., 933 F.2d 162 (2d Cir. 1991).
46. Lanham Act, § 1052 (a)-(d).






898 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
A suggestive term is just that; it suggests, rather than describes, some characteristic of
the goods or services and requires the consumer to exercise its own imagination to associ-
ate the nature of the goods and services to its source. It is protected without secondary
meaning. However,, arbitrary or fanciful terms have no association with the products or
services to which they are applied. They may also be protected without secondary
meaning.
What is secondary meaning? The court described it as showing that consumers mainly
associate the mark with the producer instead of simply the product.5 2 Courts may look to
amount and manner of advertising, volume of sales and length and manner of use as cir-
cumstantial evidence. The question is the effectiveness of the promotional efforts, not the
amount. Under the Fair Use Doctrine, if the allegedly infringing term is used fairly and
in good faith only to describe the goods or services of a party, a defendant in a trademark
infringement action may assert this defense.53 It is available only in actions involving
descriptive terms and only when the term is used in its descriptive sense rather than its




Section 45(a) of the Lanham Act requires that the mark either be: (1) used in commerce
or (2) registered with a bona fide intention to use it in commerce. In Zazu Designs v.
L'Oreal, SA., 56 the Federal Appellate Court held that Zazu's sales of its products were
insufficient use to establish priority over L'Oreal. L'Oreal entered the US market with
cheap, temporary hair color product.57 Prior to introducing the product it researched the
name ZaZu and found a salon using it, but the salon disclaimed any intention to sell its
own hair products with the Zazu name. L'Oreal never pursued it further.5S Eventually,
however, Zazu did develop send products to a few customers. 59
Under the common law, one must win the race to the marketplace to establish the
exclusive right to a mark. However, statutory-required registration modifies this system




55. Id. at 791-794. The court outlined four standards identifying descriptive terms:
1. Whenever a word or phrase conveys an immediate idea of the qualities,characteristics, effect,
purpose or ingredients of a product or service, it is classified as descriptive and cannot be claimed
as an exclusive mark;
2. Imagination Test - seeks to measure the relationship between the actual words of the mark and
the product to which they are applied. If a tern requires imagination, thought and perception to
reach a conclusion, as to the nature of the goods, it is considered a suggestive term;
3. Whether competitors would likely need the terms used in the trademark in describing their
product; and
4. This examines the extent to which a term actually has been used by others marketing a similar
service or product.
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without notice. The mere intent to use a mark as a trademark fails to establish any rights.
Note that there was a dissent in this case, which felt there was enough evidence for Zazu
to claim priority.
3. Refusal to Register or Cancellation
Section 2 of the Landham Act outlines the grounds for refusing registration. The first
type encompasses immoral or scandalous marks. In Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc.,60 the
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (the Board) addressed the issue of whether, at the time
respondent was issued each of the challenged registrations, the respondent's registered
marks comprised matter which may bring Native American persons into contempt. The
Plaintiff filed a petition seeking cancellation of the football team, the Redskins, trademark
claiming it to be derogatory towards Indians. In response, the Board held that "through
long, substantial and widespread use, advertising and promotion support thereof and me-
dia coverage, said marks have acquired a strong secondary meaning identifying the en-
tertainment services provided."61
The Board outlined a two-step process to determine whether matter is scandalous: (1)
the court or Board determines the likely meaning of the matter in question; and (2)
whether, in view of the likely meaning, the matter is scandalous to a substantial composite
of the general public.
62
The second category subject to registration refusal or cancellation is geographic marks.
In In re Nantucket, Inc., 63 the court addressed an appeal that refused to register Nantucket
on the grounds that it was primarily geographically deceptively mis-descriptive because
the actual products did not come from Nantucket. The Appellate Court reversed the
lower court's refusal for registration.
The Court defined something as primarily geographic if it is the name of a place which
has general renown to the public at large and which is a place from which goods and
services are known to emanate as a result of commercial activity. 64 Registration of marks
that would be perceived by potential purchasers as deceptively mis-describing the goods
may be denied. Registration of marks that are perceived by potential purchasers as decep-
tively mis-describing the geographic origin of the goods may also be denied. Either way,
the mark must be judged by its role in the marketplace. If the goods do not come from the
specified place, and the public does not associate the goods with the place, then the public
is not deceived. Therefore, the mark is not geographically deceptive, which is at the heart
of how the United States and the EU handle GIs differently and, thus, their dispute.
The final category includes marks which are primarily a surname, even if there are no
other meanings. These marks cannot be registered unless the average member of the
public would, upon seeing it used as a trademark, recognize it as a surname. However, it is
usually recognized that there is a right to use someone's own surname. The first user's
right is usually recognized as the sacred rights theory.
60. Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 30 U.S.P.Q. 1828 (TFAB 1984).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. In re Nantucket, Inc., 677 F.2d 95 (Cust. & Pat. App. 1982).
64. Id.
FALL 2007
900 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
4. Incontestability
In Park 'N Fly v. Dollar Park & Fly,65 the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the issue of
whether an action to enjoin the infringement of an incontestable trademark may be de-
fended on the grounds that the mark is merely descriptive. In looking to the Lanham Act,
the court found that it specifically allows cancellation of a mark any time that it has been
abandoned, even if it is an incontestable mark.6
6
To achieve this incontestable status, it must be registered. Registration is prima facie
evidence of the registrant's exclusive rights to the mark. The Lanham Act expressly pro-
vides that before a mark becomes incontestable, an opposing party may prove any legal or
equitable defense which might have been asserted if the mark had not been registered. 67
Canceling a mark on the grounds that it is merely descriptive can also occur but only if the
petition is filed in court within five years of the registration date of the mark.
5. Infringement
The most important case in U.S. trademark law, discussed below, talks about infringing
upon a registered trademark when consumer confusion is likely, which is something the
EU also explicitly prohibits. In AMF Inc. v. Sleekcrafts Boats, 6 8 the court found that
although AMF's trademark was valid, it had not been infringed.
When the alleged infringer produces goods which compete for sales with those of the
trademark owner, infringement usually will be found if the marks are sufficiently similar
that confusion can be expected. If the goods are totally unrelated, there can be no in-
fringement because confusion is unlikely. Therefore, the benchmark analysis for deter-
mining trademark infringement is whether the mark is likely to cause consumer confusion.
In determining whether confusion between related goods is likely, the following factors
are relevant:
1. Strength of the mark-only if the marks are quite similar and the goods are
closely related, will infringement be found;
2. Proximity of the goods-less similarity between the marks will suffice when the
goods are complementary, the products are sold to the same class of purchasers,
or the goods are similar in function;
3. Similarity of the marks-similarity of the marks is tested on three levels: sight,
sound, and meaning. Each must be considered as they are entities, similarities
weigh more heavily than differences;
4. Evidence of actual confusion;
5. Marketing channels used-convergent marketing channels increase likelihood of
confusion;
6. Type of goods and the degree of care likely to be exercised by the purchasers;
7. Defendant's intent in selecting the mark-when the alleged infringer knowingly
adopts a mark similar to another's, reviewing courts presume that the defendant
can accomplish his purpose: that is, that the public will be deceived; and
65. Park 'N Fly v. Dollar Park & Fly, 469 U.S. 189 (1985).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. AMF Inc. v. Sleekcrafts Boats, 599 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1979).
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8. Likelihood of expansion of the product's line.
The court looked to the reasonable purchaser at the time the product was issued and




Section 43 of the Lanham Act defines dilution as the lessening of the famous mark's
capacity to identify and distinguish goods or services regardless of the presence or absence
of a competition between the parties or the likelihood of confusion, mistake, or decep-
tion. 70 If the diluting use began after the mark has gained the status of famous, the famous
mark's owner is entitled to injunctive relief.7 1 In Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., the
court found Nabisco's use of a goldfish shaped cheese cracker would dilute Pepperidge
Farm's Goldfish Crackers. 72 The Appellate court affirmed, looking to the five established
necessary elements to claim a dilution: (1) The senior mark must be famous; (2) It must be
distinctive; (3) The junior use must be a commercial use in commerce; (4) It must begin
after the senior mark has become famous; and (5) It must cause dilution of the distinctive
quality of the senior mark.
73
The court defined distinctiveness in a mark as a characteristic quite different from
fame. 74 Instead, it placed the mark on a ladder reflecting their inherent strength or weak-
ness. It is also a statutory element. 75 In looking to the junior use of the mark, the senior
mark's degree of distinctiveness is crucial: "The marks must be of sufficient similarity so
that, in the mind of the consumer, the junior mark will conjure an association with the
senior." 76 The court also looked to the extent of overlap among the consumers of the
senior product and the junior product.77 It is also important to look to the consumer's
actual confusion. The Dilution Doctrine comprises two principal types of harm: first,
blurring, in which it allegedly reduces the exclusive association between the senior mark
and its source, and second, tarnishment, which arises where a junior user uses the mark to
advertise lesser quality products, hurting the senior user's image.
VI. EU Trademark System
A. THE CTM
In 1980, the first draft of the Community Trade Mark (CTM) Regulation came out.7 8
This regulation would have the trademark office hold concurrent jurisdiction with the
national courts in regards to applications for revocation or invalidation, but the national
69. Id.
70. Merges, supra note 35, at 626.
71. Id. at 636-659






78. Council Regulation (EEC) No 40/94, 20 Dec. 1993, O. J. (LO1l).
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courts would handle infringement actions with appeals directed to the national appellate
courts as normal. 79 Today, many portions of this regulation remain in force.
1. EU Trademark Definition
A CTM may consist of any signs capable of being represented graphically, particularly
words, including personal names, designs, letters, numerals, the shape of goods or of their
packaging, provided that such signs are capable of distinguishing the goods or services of
one undertaking from those of other undertakings. 80
The CTM must be (1) distinctive, (2) not-deceptive, and (3) not in conflict with some-
one else's earlier rights.s l Similar to the United States, the intent of protecting the trade-
mark is to protect consumers against confusion with other similar marks.
2. Effect on National Laws of Member States
This new CTM grants trademark protection within all the EU countries from one ap-
plication as well as the exclusive right to prevent all third parties from using this mark in
the EU Member State countries.82 This process is independent of the national regula-
tions and trademark rights. It grants protection for a period of ten years and allows subse-
quent renewals. However, should a trademark holder choose to do so, they can still file at
the national level and remain only in that one country.
The EC Regulation 40/94's preamble declares that any rules contained in the Brussels
Convention8 3 will apply to these marks, but if the regulation itself conflicts, the regulation
will dominate. Therefore, the important lis pendens rule of the Brussels Convention re-
mains effective, preventing two different Member States from adjudicating the same
claims and same acts simultaneously. The first Member State with jurisdiction to bring
the proceedings can continue while any subsequent actions brought in other courts must
wait and honor that judgment.
B. CommuNrTY TRADE MARK REQUIREMENTS
1. Distinctiveness
Distinctiveness means that it cannot be a mark already in regular public use by a corpo-
ration, registered with the Madrid Protocol, or a previous CTM. The CTM provides
protection against infringement by: "(a) identical trademarks for identical goods and ser-
vices; (b) trademarks subject to a likelihood of confusion due to identity or similarity in the
goods and services covered; and (c) trademarks that cause dilution."8 4
As mentioned above the likelihood of confusion, so important under US laws, is also
very important with regards to the CTM. The EC Regulation 40/94 preamble outlines
79. CHRISTOPHER WADLOw, ENFORCFMENT OF N-TELLECTUAL PROP. L-N EUROPEAN AND INTERNA-
TIONAL LAw 226 (Sweet & Maxwell) (1998).
80. Council Regulation (EEC) No. 40/94, supra note 78, art. 4.
81. Id. at preamble, art. 8.
82. Alan Swan & John Murphey, Cases and Materials on the Regulation of International Business and Economic
Relations, Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. 185 (2d ed. LEXIS Publishing) (1999).
83. Council Regulation (EEC) No. 40/94, supra note 78.
84. Id.
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several elements a court should consider when determining whether a mark creates a like-
lihood of confusion. The following are the four elements listed: (1) "the recognition of
the trade mark on the market," (2) "the association which can be made with the used or
registered sign," (3) "the degree of similarity between the trade mark and the sign," and
(4) the degree of similarity "between the goods or services identified."85 Therefore, the
court must look to elements constituting similarity, market awareness and associations
that can be made with the mark. Again, these factors are similar to those the U.S. courts
look at for likelihood of confusion. In this area, the United States and the EU follow
similar principles.
2. Non-Deceptive
Article 7(l)( g) of EC Regulation 40/94 specifically states that the Office shall not regis-
ter any trademarks that "are of such a nature as to deceive the public, for instance as to the
nature, quality or geographical origin of the goods or service."8 6 It prohibits registration
of goods which consist of signs that have simply become customary in the current lan-
guage or those that somehow designate generally the quality, geographical origin (as they
protect those in a later regulation), time or method of production, value, intended pur-
pose, etc.87
3. Priority
Section 2(29) of EC Regulation 40-94 grants applicants a six month priority period. 88 If
they have previously filed with any State which is a party to the Paris Convention for the
same mark as they are attempting to register as a CTM, they will receive this six months
priority from the date of the original application with the other state. It also grants this
priority to those who filed any regular national filing under a State which has a bilateral or
multilateral agreement granting such right. A person attempting to register a trademark
cannot register that which is the same as someone else with a priority application or that
matches another trademark already registered.
4. Appeals
EC Regulation 40/94 Title VII makes a provision for appealing the examiner's decisions
in regards to registering the trademark. The appellant first must address the office which
made the initial decision. If this office refuses to change its determination, the appellant
may bring its case before the Office's Board of Appeal. The final place of appeal is the
ECJ, which retains final jurisdiction over the matter. The appellant has two months to file
its initial notice of appeal.8 9 Within the four following months, the appellant must submit
its grounds for appeal. The appellant then waits for the Board of Appeals to make its
determination. It can only go before the ECJ on issues based on lack of competence,
infringement of an essential procedural requirement, and infringement of the Treaty, of
85. EC Reg. 40/94 preamble O.J. LOI 1 (20 Dec. 1993).
86. Id. at art. 7(1)( g).
87. Id. at art. 7(l)( a-i).
88. EC Reg. 40/94 § 2(29) OJ. L011 (20 Dec. 1993).
89. Id. at art. 58.
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the Regulation or any rule of law. 90 It is important to point out that the trademark holder
can prevent a third party from using "his own name or descriptive or geographic terms." 9'
C. ECJ CASE LAW REGULATING TRADEMARKs
The ECJ looks to the purpose of trademarks in determining the protection it provides.
It then balances this with Article 30 of the European Economic Treaty (EEC), which
prohibits any restraints on the free movement of trade amongst the EU member coun-
tries. The marks are used to ensure to the buyer that the marks originated from the
producer and can also allow the producer to protect any goodwill created with this partic-
ular mark.9
2
In Centrafarm BV v. Winthrop BV, the ECJ addressed whether EC law prohibited a
trademark holder from preventing another to import its marked goods, originating from
another country from which they had been placed on the market by the trademark holder
or with its consent.9 3 The ECJ looked to the purpose of trademarks and found that the
specific object of these marks was to provide the trademark holder the exclusive right to
place its products first in circulation. This, thereby, protects the trademark holder from
using the trademark and capitalizing on the trademark holder's reputation without its con-
sent. The ECJ held this would ultimately allow the trademark holder the ability to parti-
tion the national markets. 94
Basically, the court recognized the existence of a property right, but EC law controlled
the exercise of these national trademark rights.95 To exhaust these rights, consent gov-
erned. If the goods were originally placed into the stream of commerce with the trade-
mark holder's consent, there is not much it can do to control subsequent movement of
those goods. This general principle is now explicitly reflected in the EC Regulation 40/94
preamble.
In Hoffirann-La Roche & Co. AG v. Centrafarm Vertriebsgesellschaft Pharmazeutiscer
Erzeugnisse mbH,9 6 the ECJ addressed whether a trademark holder's exclusive rights allows
it to prevent a third party from affixing a mark after repackaging the product. After reiter-
ating the same principles as above, the ECJ held that Article 36, now Article 30, or the
EEC Treaty did give the trademark holder the right to prevent a third party importer
from repackaging the product and then affixing a trademark on the product without the
trademark holder's consent. In Centrafarm BVv. Amer. Home Prod. Corp.,97 the ECJ held
the right to affix the trademark on the product was the trade mark holder's exclusive right.
The above cases give an idea of how the ECJ may handle trademark issues between the
EU Member States. Below is a discussion of the specific dispute that recently occurred
between the United States and the EU in regards to trademark protections.
90. Id. at art. 63(2).
91. Swan, svpra note 82, at 186.
92. PAUL CRAIG & GRAINNE DE BURCA, EU LAW: TExT, CASES, & MATERIALS 1093 (Oxford Univ. Press
3d ed. 2003).
93. Case 16/74, ECR 1183 (1974).
94. Id.
95. CRAic, supra note 92, at 1094-1095.
96. Case 102/77, ECR 01139 (1978).
97. Case 3/78, ECR 01823 (1978).
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VII. The "Foods Name" Case & The Panel's Decision
It began when WTO Members negotiated over protecting wines and spirits as GIs at
the Fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar, in 2001.98 The TRIPS Council first
had to address the creation of a wine and spirits register and, second, whether TRIPS
should protect more than just spirits and wines as GIs.99 Initially, the Fifth Ministerial
Conference in Cancun, Mexico, held in 2003, was charged with resolving these issues, but
the member countries simply could not agree, and the deadline was not met. 0 0 Both
Australia and the United States objected to the EU's proposals of extending GI protection
and they specifically objected to the EU's own laws enacted in 1992, which expanded GI
protection to agricultural products and foodstuffs.Iol
Prior to this, in 1999, the United States had requested consultations with the EU be-
cause of Regulation 2081/91 on the protection of geographical indications and designa-
tions of origin for agricultural products and foodstuffs.102 The United States felt that its
agricultural products were being discriminated against by virtue of Regulation 2081/92
and proceeded to consultations in accordance with the DSU. The consultations did not
resolve the disputes and on April 17, 2003, Australia also requested consultations with the
EU on this same Regulation. 10 3
On August 18, 2003, both the United States and Australia separately requested the DSB
to establish a panel."°4 Since the claims and concerns were essentially the same, the DSB
established one single panel on October 2, 2003.105
After meeting with the parties in June and August 2004,106 the Panel submitted its final
report to the parties on December 21, 2004.107 Finally, the DSB adopted the final report
on April 20, 2005.108 Following is a detailed description of the claims, relevant provisions,
and how the Panel resolved this dispute.
The two main contentions from the United States were that: (1) the EC Regulation
2081/92 violated the principle of national treatment as found in the TRIPS Agreement
and GATT 1994, and (2) it did not provide adequate protection to trademarks. Although
other claims were also involved, these are the most substantive and substantial. Arguably,
the true debate really centered on these arguments, and it is the Panel's decision in these
two fields that substantiates the claims that both the United States and the EU won.
First is a detailed analysis and claims surrounding the assertion that the EU's Regula-
tion violated the principle of national treatment. This principle, simply described, is the
98. Becki Graham, Ten Years Later: Compromise or Conflict over Geographical Indications, 2005 SYRACUSE SCL








106. Panel Report, European Communities - Protection of Trademarks & Geographical Indications for
Agricultural Products & Foodstuffs, WT/DS174/R, 9. 1.6 (Mar. 15, 2005) [hereinafter 2005 European
Communities].
107. Id. T 1.7.
108. http://www.wto.org/English/tratop-e/dispu-e/cases-e/dsl 74-e.htm.
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concept that Members are required to afford other Members national treatment that is no
less favorable than what it grants its nationals in terms of intellectual property rights and
protection. In terms of GATT, it has more to do with equal competitive opportunity and
market access once goods have been imported.
Second is an analysis of the next major claim related to whether or not the EU, through
Regulation 2081/92, denied current trademark owners their rights against third parties. It
was in this area that the EU claimed a victory. During the discussion of the Panel's con-
clusions, the relevant provisions will be pointed out, the Panel's interpretation of these
provisions, and their resulting conclusion.
A. DID REGULATION 2081/92 VIOLATE THE NATIONAL TREATMENT PRINCIPLE?
The United States claimed that the regulation's definition of GIs made it such that
those GIs not located within the EU could only be registered if the owner meets the
specific demands of Article 12(1) of the Regulation even for GIs located in a WTO Mem-
ber's region.' 0 9 This article requires that a WTO Member or other third party country
install an equivalent GI protection system in their own jurisdiction in order to be eligible
to register their GIs in the EU.
The EU counters that this is not the case for Wv/TO Members but instead that the
introductory phrase found at the beginning of Article 12(1) provides the pertinent loop-
hole, allowing WA/TO Members to still enjoy protective privileges." 0 This phrase states
that thee article applies "without prejudice to international agreements."MI The EU ar-
gued that the WTO Members only had to comply with the standards found in the TRIPS
Agreement." 2 The United States and the Panel disagreed.
Although both parties agreed and recognized that the regulation outlines two registra-
tion procedures, one for nationals of the EU and one for third countries, the parties dis-
agreed over whether or not the third country procedure, found in Articles 12(a) and 12(b),
actually resulted in additional conditions not found in the procedure for EC nationals." 3
The EU also argued that there was a possible third approach, which would fall under the
phrase allowing for registration by means of an international agreement.14
Article 12(1) states:
Without prejudice to international agreements, this Regulation may apply to an agri-
cultural product or foodstuff from a third country provided that: The third country is
able to give guarantees identical or equivalent to [those referred to in Article 4], The
third country concerned has inspection arrangements and a right to objection
equivalent to those laid down [in this Regulation], The third country concerned is
prepared to provide protection equivalent to that available in the Community to cor-
responding agricultural products or foodstuffs coming from the Community. 15






115. Id. art. 12(1).
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1. First Issue: Were Third-Country Procedures Available to WTO Members?
The first issue was whether or not the third country procedures were available to WTO
Members who do not satisfy those requirements listed above in Article 12(1)116 In deter-
mining this question, the Panel looked to Article 12(3), which stated that "the Commis-
sion shall examine . . . whether a third country satisfies the equivalence conditions and
offers guarantees [within the meaning of paragraph 1] as a result of its national legisla-
tion."1 17 It goes on to confirm that a positive decision by the Commission means that the
procedure set out in Article 12(a) applies.
The Panel found that no other provisions in Articles 12(a) and 12(b) suggest that some
other procedure, not having to satisfy Article 12(1), was truly available for third countries
or WTO Members. There was mention of the "without prejudice to international agree-
ments" phrase, but the Panel found that there were not any such agreements incorporat-
ing the same procedures.118 In the regulation's Preamble, it discusses making provisions
for trade with third countries, but it again used the phrase "equivalent guarantees for the
issue and inspection" of GIs, which clearly referred to the Article 12(1) conditions.1' 9 In
April 2003, the regulation was slightly amended and the Preamble there states that the
protection is "open to third countries' names by reciprocity and under equivalence condi-
tions as provided for in Articlel2 of that Regulation." 120
The Panel found this sufficiently clear to hold that third countries, including WTO
Members, had to satisfy the conditions in Article 12(1) to register their GIs.12 1 The Panel
quoted some of the EU's own statements in supporting its view.
In September 2002, the EU stated the following to the Council for TRIPS,:
Under the current EC regulations, the EC does not appear to provide protection for
non-EC geographical indications (i.e. place names of other WVTO Members), except
on the basis of bilateral agreements, or if the EC has determined that a country has a
system for GIs that is equivalent to the detailed system of the EC.122
The following statement was made in a press release when it extending the right of
objection in the Regulation was proposed:
Beyond mere TRIPS consistency, the Commission proposes important amendments
designed to promote the EU system of denominations of origin as a model to the rest
of the world. The driving idea behind it is the wish to improve protection of Euro-
pean quality products also outside the EU. As the EU cannot force non-EU coun-
tries to do so, they would be invited to do so on a "reciprocal basis." If a non-EU
country introduced an 'equivalent system' including the right of objection for the EU
116. Id. 7.111.
117. Id. 1 7.109.
118. Id. 7.117.
119. Id. 1 7.120.
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and the commitment to protect EU names on their territory, the EU would offer a
specific protection to register their products for the EU market.123
2. Issue 2: Reciprocity, Equivalence, Less Favorable Treatment
The United States further claimed that requirements of reciprocity and equivalence
directly violated Article 3.1 of the TRIPS Agreement. 124 It argued that this resulted in
less favorable treatment, and the Panel noted that the U.S. pointed to some GAT 1994
case law stating that this principle could be addressed by determining whether the mea-
sure's effect is to modify the competition conditions of the EU to the detriment of other
VTO Members when protecting intellectual property rights. 2 5 The EU countered that
the Regulation did not depend on nationality. 126 It expanded on this argument by point-
ing out there was nothing to prevent a non-EU country from setting up an establishment
in the EU and thus receiving the registration procedures given GIs located in the EU.127
Finally, the EU felt that the difference based on where the GIs were located was not
enough to show less favorable treatment. 128
In addressing these claims, the Panel first looked to Article 3.1 of the TRIPS Agree-
ment, which states:
Each Member shall accord to the nationals of other Members treatment no less
favorable than that it accords to its own nationals with regard to the protection of
intellectual property; subject to the exceptions already provided in, respectively, the
Paris Convention (1967), the Berne Convention (1971), the Rome Convention or the
Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits .... 129
Therefore, it appears that there are two elements the United States must show to estab-
lish an inconsistency with Article 3.1.130 "(1) The measure at issue must apply with regard
to the protection of intellectual property; and (2) the nationals of other Members must be
accorded 'less favorable' treatment than the Member's own nationals."131
The first issue is defining the term "protection." The Panel looked to Footnote 3 of
Article 3.1, which states:
For purposes of Articles 3 and 4, "protection" shall include matters affecting the
availability, acquisition, scope, maintenance and enforcement of intellectual property
rights as well as those matters affecting the use of intellectual property rights specifi-
cally addressed in this Agreement. 32
123. Id. T1 7.82 (citing European Commission: "Food Quality: Commission proposes better protection for
geographical names." (Press Release Ref. IP/02?422), Brussels, 15 Mar. 2002, set out in Exhibit A US-4).
124. Id. T 7.154.
125. Id. T 7.157.
126. Id. T 7.162.
127. Id. T 7.162.
128. Id. T1 7.163.
129. Id. 7.175
130. Id.
131. 2005 European Communities, supra note 106, 9 7.259.
132. Id. at note 3.
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Article 1.2 defines the term "intellectual property" as referring to "all categories of
intellectual property that are subject to Sections I through 7 of Part Hl."133 GIs, as the
Regulation defines them, fall within this list and, therefore, the Panel conclusively found
them to be intellectual property.' 34 This in turn satisfied the first requirement that it
address the protection of intellectual property.135
This brings us to the second element, which is ensuring that there is not less favorable
treatment to the nationals of other members. The Panel pointed out that Article 3.1
contained national treatment elements derived from both the pre-existing intellectual
property agreements and GATT 1994, with a few non-applicable exceptions. 136
To define whether the obligations under the Regulation constitute less favorable treat-
ment, the Panel first looked to a WTO case, which held that a GATT 1994 case gave the
appropriate examination standard. The GATT Panel in U.S.-Section 377, defined less
favorable treatment under Article III as follows:
The words "treatment no less favourable" in paragraph 4 call for effective equality of
opportunities for imported products in respect of the application of laws, regulations
and requirements affecting the internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transporta-
tion, distribution or use of products. This clearly sets a minimum permissible stan-
dard as a basis. 137
Subsequently, the Panel looked to a GATT Appellate Panel decision, U.S.-FSC (Arti-
cle 21.5-EC) for an explanation of its approach to "treatment no less favourable." 13s It
created the "fundamental thrust and effect of the measure itself" test, which required
"careful analysis" of the measure and of its effects on the market. 139
The EU acknowledged that Article 12(1) did provide less favorable treatment to those
for whom it applies, but it retained its defense that the Article did not apply to WTO
Members. 14° Since this was already found to not be the case by the Panel, the Panel
concluded that the Regulation did, in fact, provide less favorable treatment to the WTO
Members not situated in the EU.141 The Panel felt that satisfying the conditions of Arti-
cle 12(1) or entering into a special international agreement were extra hurdles that created
less favorable treatment.142
The Panel looked to the treatment of nationals of other Members under this Regula-
tion, defining the issue as "how the less favourable treatment accorded under the Regula-
tion with respect to the availability of protection affects the treatment accorded to
nationals of other Members and that accorded to the European Communities' own na-
tionals for the purposes of Article 3.1 of the TRIPS Agreement."143
133. Id. T 7.485.
134. Id. T 7.178.
135. Id. 1 7.179.
136. Id. 7.181.
137. Panel Report, U.S. - Section 337, L16439, 5.11 (Nov. 17, 1989).
138. 2005 European Communities, supra note 106, T 7.186.
139. Panel Report, U.S.-FSC (Article 21.5 - EC),WT/DSI08?AB/RW2 1 215 (citing Korea - Various
Measures on Beef, 9 142, and Japan - Alcoholic Beverages II, at 110).
140. 2005 European Communities, supra note 106, 9 7.189.
141. Id. T 7.190.
142. Id. 91 7.189.
143. Id. 9 7.191.
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In defining nationals, the Panel looked to the Paris Convention (1967), which did not
directly define the term. 144 Instead, in Article 3, it defined nationals as those having "real
and effective industrial or commercial establishments." 45 The Convention would refer a
Member first to its own law for a natural person and to whatever own criteria it has for
legal persons. 146 Since the TRIPS Agreement requires each Member to treat nationals of
other Members the same as their own nationals, how they define its own nationals may be
subject to review to verify they conform with this principle. 147
The regulation does not refer to nationals on its face, and the Panel looked to it to
determine how the nationals of other Members were treated in comparison with those of
the EU.148 As the EU argued, the regulation on its face treats nationals everywhere the
same when protecting GIs because it is merely referring to the GIs locations. 149 Identical
treatment on its face, however, does not itself satisfy the national treatment principle, so
the Panel divided up the groups to which the regulation applied. In doing so, it found that
Article 12(1) applied to EU nationals with a GI located outside the EU and to non-EU
nationals with a GI located outside the EU.
As such, the Panel looked to the effective equality for these groups seeking GI protec-
tion under this regulation.'5 0 The regulation makes several required specifications for
someone to actually use a registered GI, and these minimum requirements include such
things as evidence of the region it came from, local methods used, and details which prove
the link of the "geographical environment or the geographical origin."'' The Panel
found these requirements to the availability of protection as formally discriminating be-
tween persons producing in accordance with European specification and those who do
not.152 The Panel felt that the vast majority of nationals seeking such protection would be
those located outside the EU in comparison with those located within it but seeking pro-
tection outside the EU. 53
Finally, the purpose of the TRIPS Agreement, according to the Panel, would be "se-
verely undermined if a Member could avoid its obligations by simply according treatment
to its own nationals on the basis of close substitute criteria, such as place of production, or
establishment, and denying the treatment to the nationals of other WTO Members who
produce or are established in their own countries." 154
3. Did It Also Violate the NT Principle Under GATT 1994?
After finding that the Regulation violated the national treatment principle under the
TRIPS Agreement, the Panel looked to whether it also violated this principle under the
144. Id. T 7.192.
145. Id. T1 7.195.
146. Id. 1 7.197.
147. Id. 91 7.198.
148. Id. 91 7.205.
149. Id. 91 7.206.
150. Id. 91 7.218.
151. Id. 9 7.224.
152. Id. 1 7.226.
153. Id. T 7.232.
154. Id. T 7.235.
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GATT 1994.155 The GATT 1994, in contrast to the TRIPS Agreement, meant to ensure
quality competition conditions between products.'
5 6
The United States asserts that this regulation violates GATT 1994 Article I1: 4 because
of the reciprocity and equivalence conditions required for protection. It argues that it
imposes distinct additional requirements and, therefore, the conditions of competition for
imported products are modified. "If another WTO Member is not willing and able to
satisfy them [the additional conditions], GIs from that Member are unable to be registered
and protected for products imported from that Member into the EC market."' 57 It also
asserts that agricultural products and foodstuffs from the EU and third countries are con-
sidered like products under Aricle ff1: 4 GATT 1994, which the EU does not contest.
58
Instead, the EU argues that the Regulation is not a measure affecting the internal sale of
products and that it does not result in less favorable treatment to these imported products
because, as it has consistently argued, Article 12(1) does not apply additional conditions to
other WTO Members.' 5 9
The Panel's view is that the EU does not contest the fact that Article 12(1) does conflict
with Article III: 4 GATT 1994 when applied to WTO Members, and earlier the Panel
already determined that it did apply to them. In this way, the regulation is inconsistent
with Article II: 4 GATT 1994.160 In addressing the question of less favorable treatment
under the GATT 1994, the Panel followed the analysis applied in the Appellate Body
Report in Korea-Various Measures on Beef161 and U.S.-FSC (Article 21.5-EC). 162 The
issue to be addressed, according to these cases, is whether the measures are detrimental to
imported products because they modify the conditions of competition between the im-
ported and domestic products.
163
The Panel determined that a substantive advantage affecting the conditions of competi-
tion was that registering did not prevent competition but it does prevent products bearing
an indication within the scope of a registered GI from being sold on the market. 164 Thus,
those products registered in the EU could obtain this advantage while those like products
failing to meet the Article 12(1) reciprocity and equivalence standards would not receive
this advantage.' 65 To describe it in a phrase used earlier by the Panel, this creates an
"extra hurdle" for the WTO Members to get GI protection under this Regulation.' 66
Therefore, the Panel held that the reciprocity and equivalent conditions, as laid out in
Article 12(1) of the regulation did violate Article III: 4 GATT 1994.167
155. Id. 9 7.242.
156. Id.
157. Id. 9 7.256.
158. Id. 9 7.255, 7.257.
159. Id. 9 7.257, 7.258.
160. Id. 9. 7.262.
161. Korea-Various Measures on Beef, supra note 139, 9 137, 142 and US - FSC (Article 21.5 - EC), svpra
note 139, T 215.
162. 2005 European Communities, supra note 58, 7.266.
163. Id.
164. Id. 7.267.
165. Id. $ 7.269.
166. Id. T 7.269.
167. Id. T 7.277.
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This paper focuses primarily on the equivalence and reciprocity language within the
regulation, as this was the largest substantive point addressed by the panel. It is also the
point on which the United States claimed victory. The case goes on to apply a similar
analysis to the application procedures, the objection procedures, and the labeling
requirement.
B. DID THE EC EFFECTIVELY DENY TRADEMARK OWNERS THEIR ExCLusrvE
RIGHTS AGAINST THIRD PARnES?
This leads us to the second substantive requirement, one which the EU won. After
discussing the respective claims and how the Panel resolved them, this paper will further
discuss the "both are winners" proposition.
The United States, unlike the EU, is not a large supporter of expanding the protection
given GIs. As such, it attempted to limit the EU's ability to protect GIs in this regulation
concurrently with trademarks.
The United States claimed that the regulation denied trademark owners their exclusive
right against a third party's prior use of their mark, resulting in a likelihood of confusion
for the consumers. 168 It argued this was inconsistent with Article 16.1 of the TRIPS
Agreement. 169 The EU gave a thorough response, claiming that Article 14(3) of the Reg-
ulation prevented this result and that Article 24.5 of the TRIPS Agreement allowed for
such a co-existence of GIs and trademarks. 170 It also argued that Article 14(2) of the
Regulation is a justified exception under Article 17 of the TRIPS Agreement. 171
The Panel analyzed the wording of the regulation to verify that, although the GI is
given rights which would prevail over the trademark, there are occasions in which a trade-
mark holder would prevail over the GI.172 "The European Communities argues that Arti-
clel4(3) of the Regulation, together with the criteria for resistibility of trademarks applied
under EC law, prevent the registration of a GI, use of which would result in a likelihood
of confusion with a prior trademark." 173 Australia and the United States disagreed, and,
therefore, the Panel addressed this factual issue. 174
The Panel again looked to the procedures available in the Regulation to see whether or
not the likelihood of confusion was sufficiently safe guarded. It noted that Article 14(3)
requires the EC to deny registrations that do not allow for some level of discretion. Arti-
cle 7(4) of the Regulation provides a procedure to object to the proposed GI name which
would "jeopardize the existence ... of the mark." 75
The Panel first observed that Article 14(3) required refusal of a GI's registration should
it mislead consumers.1 76 Second, they observed that the Regulation expressly prohibits a
168. Id. 7.316.
169. Id.
170. Id. 1 7.517.
171. Id.
172. Id. T 7.534.
173. Id. 7.535.
174. Id.
175. Id. T 7.548.
176. Id. 1 7.560.
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GI if it conflicts with a trademark that has been used for a long time, has developed a
reputation and is, therefore, renowned. 177
Finally, the panel observed that Article 14(3) never referred to use nor to likelihood of
confusion, even when the other provisions did. The Panel felt that this meant it would
apply the lack of likelihood of confusion in narrower instances. 178 Therefore, the Panel
felt that Australia and the United States had made a prima facie case that Article 14(3)
failed to prevent all cases which would limit a trademark's owner's rights. 179
The Panel noted an inconsistency with the EC's claim of how Article 14(3), in practice,
prevents GI registration that would cause confusion with a prior trademark and the four
times when it has occurred. These four times were, namely, the Budweiser case outlined
below, comprising three of the times, and the case involving Bavarian Beer and Bayer-
isches Bier18 0 The Panel then addressed the issue of whether the TRIPS Agreement
requires Members to make available rights to trademark holders against signs when they
are used as GIs.181
The United States claimed that Article 24.5 of the TRIPS Agreement creates a positive
right which specified that trademark rights couldn't be adversely affected and that the
article, together with Articles 22.3 and 23.2, set the boundaries for a Member to create GI
Protection.18 2 The EU countered that this was unfounded and that trademarks and GIs
are on equal footing with regards to the TRIPS Agreement. 8 3
1. Two-Step Analysis Under TRIPS
The Panel first determined that the rights provided in Article 16.1 of the TRIPS Agree-
ment were violated by the coexistent protection the EC gave, but then it looked to Article
17 to decide that a limited exception was available to them. 184 Article 17 provides the
following: "Members may provide limited exceptions to the rights conferred by a trade-
mark, such as fair use of descriptive terms, provided that such exceptions take account of
the legitimate interests of the owner of the trademark and of third parties." 185
Therefore, Article 17 does expressly permit these limited exceptions, and the wording
indicates that the exception must both be (1) limited and (2) in compliance with the pro-
viso to be consistent with Article 17.186 The issue is whether the exception to the rights a
trademark confers is narrow and not how many trademarks it would affect.' 87 Since the
only right in dispute here is the one that prevents uses resulting in a likelihood of confu-
sion, the Panel examined the exception on a "per right" basis.' 88
177. Id. 9 7.561.
178. Id. 9 7.562.
179. Id. 7.563.
180. Id. 7.572-7.573.
181. Id. T 7.577.
182. Id. 9 7.579.
183. Id. 7.583.
184. Id. 99 7.597, 7.625, 7.686.
185. Id. 1 7.648.
186. Id.
187. Id. T 7.650.
188. Id. 9] 7.651.
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The Panel acknowledged that the Regulation did deprive some trademark owner's
rights against some third parties, but it did not do this to all trademark owners. 189 It only
affects those who attempt to use a trademark which is confusingly similar to a registered
GI, unless the trademark had a prior use. 190 The Panel emphasized that their rights
against third parties were not in any other way curtailed.' 91
The Panel agreed with the EU's assertion that Article 14(2) only provides that the
trademark may continue to be used and that the trademark owners still retain their rights,
especially against linguistic variations not registered and goods failing to comply with the
specifications or geographical requirements of the Regulation. 92 For this reason, the
Panel found that the Regulation was, in fact, a limited exception as intended under Article
17 of the TRIPS Agreement. 193
2. Did This Limited Exception Take into Account the Trademark Owner and Third Parties'
Legitimate Reasons?
In determining whether this limited exception satisfied the proviso that "such excep-
tions take account of the legitimate interests" of the trademark owner and third parties
and what the legitimate interests were, 194 the Panel first looked to the view in Ca-
nada-Pharmaceutical Patents 195 to determine what legitimate interests were. 196 The
Panel in that case looked to Article 30 and defined it as follows:
To make sense of the term "legitimate interest" in this context, that term must be
defined in the way that it is often used in legal discourse - as a normative claim
calling for the protection of interests that are 'justifiable' in the sense that they are
supported by relevant public policies or other social norms. 197
The Panel felt this was true of legitimate interests in Article 17 and, therefore, extended
this holding to the article. 198
The Panel felt the legitimate interest of a trademark owner preserving its distinctiveness
so that it can function, including using it to make a connection with its own services or
undertakings, was what was needed to be taken into account under Article 17.199 Doing so
would then take account of the mark's economic value and the Panel felt that the Regula-
tion effectively did this in several ways. 200 One way was that Article 7(4) made an objec-
tion admissible if the proposed GI would "jeopardize the existence . . . of a mark."20 1
189. Id. T 7.656.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. 1 7.659.
193. Id. 7.661.
194. Id. 9] 7.662.
195. Id. 1 7.69.
196. ld. T 7.663.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. T 7.664.
200. Id. T 7.665.
201. Id. T 7.665.
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In looking to the Article 17 proviso and comparing it with other TRIPS Agreement
provisos and Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention (1971), it noted that Article 17's proviso
only required that the exceptions "take account" of legitimate interests and fails to address
any "unreasonable prejudice" to those interests.2 02 Therefore, the Panel concluded that
there was a lesser standard to apply.2 03
After looking at the above analysis and to the fact that out of 800 registered GIs only
four could result in a likelihood of confusion, the Panel concluded that the regulation
sufficiently took into account the trademark owner's legitimate interests. Three of those
cases involved the Czech beer and Budweiser and the final concerned Bayerische Bier. In
regards to the Budweiser case, there was a likelihood of confusion, and in the latter case,
there was not sufficient likelihood of confusion.204
The Panel concluded that the Regulation, with respect to this trademark claim, did
violate Article 16.1 of the TRIPS Agreement, but that it was saved by the exception under
Article 17 of the TRIPS Agreement.2 05
C. WHY DID BOTH SIDES CLAIM A VICTORY?
As can be seen from this analysis, both sides achieved victories. On December 21, 2004,
the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) declared that the WTO
Panel determined the EC GIs regulation as violating the TRIPS Agreement because it
discriminated against non-EU countries.206
However, the EU contended that the decision merely required the EC Regulation to be
clearer in addressing discriminatory affects on foreign companies seeking trademark pro-
tection in the EU.20 7 The EU felt that this was merely a technical concern that could
easily be fixed, and there were no serious impacts from this decision.2 08 Therefore, both
the EU and the United States declared this a victory. However, it does appear that on the
first issue the United States truly won because the EU was forced to make its Regulation
clearly avoid discriminating. Despite the EU claiming the entire time that Article 12(1)
did not apply to VVTO Members, the Panel felt differently and forced the EU to revise its
Regulation.
Where the EU truly won is with the trademark ruling. The Panel declared that it could
maintain its co-existing programs in which both trademarks and GIs existed. This is a
clear victory for the EU, even though the United States still claimed a small victory here
as well. As already mentioned the Panel did clarify that linguistic variations not specifi-
cally registered could not receive protection. As such, one of the United States main
202. Id. 1 7.671.
203. Id.
204. Id. 1 7.673.
205. Id. 7.686.
206. Richard Mills, Press Release, Office of USTR, United States Wins WTO Case Against EU over Food
Names (Dec. 21, 2004), available at http://www.ustr.gov/DocumentLibrary/Press-Release/2004/Decembre/
UnitedStates_WnsWTOCaseAgainstEUOver_FoodNames.htnl.
207. US Claims rictory in WTO Case on Geographically Linked Product Names, BRIDGES WEEKLY TRADE
NEWS DIGEST, vol. 8, no. 41 (Dec. 1, 2004), available at http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/04-12-01/story2.htm.
208. Id. The article quotes Arancha Gonzalez as saying, "This is a technical point which the EU will be in a
position to clarify in its legislation without difficulty." She argued that the US lost on "their claim against an
EU law that permits the co-existence of GIs with pre-existing trademarks with similar sounding names."
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constituents, Budweiser Beer, won. Therefore, the United States claimed a victory on this
small point only in regards to the trademark ruling.
This argument appears correct based on the points that both parties came out winners,
with the United States winning the major issue on the discrimination claim and the EU
winning on the trademark ruling. Each achieved a major victory in the two largest argu-
ments before the Panel.
VIII. Potential Implications
A. THE NORmH-SouTH DMDE OR OLD WORLD VERSUS NEW WORLD:
Typically, TRIPS negotiations create a North-South divide in which the northern
countries align against the southern countries over such things as trade measures and
other intellectual property rights protections. However, the case involving GIs has re-
sulted in an Old World-New World divide.20
9
The Anheuser-Busch Budweiser trademark in the United States and Budvar in the EU
provide a perfect example. The U.S. beer company enjoys a trademark for the Budweiser
brand name; however, in the EU, the Budvar beer company holds a GI for the name
Budejovicke pivo, which translates to Budweiser.2' 0 Budvar attempted to use this GI to
use the Budweiser translation in about twenty EU countries, where Anheuser-Busch holds
a trademark on Budweiser. The WTO's ruling that there might be an opportunity for an
"existing trademark holder to object if there's confusion" appears to be a win for
Anheuser-Busch in this debate. 211 This gives a classic example of how the two regions
could have serious conflicts in how the EU and the United States handle trademarks and
GIs distinctively different.
The Havana Club Rum 212 case provides another example involving a controversial deci-
sion around GIs. 213 This case, involving the WTO, the Cuban Government, the United
States, and the EU, circulated around the issue of whether rum that was not produced in
Cuba could still use the name Havana. 214 The unique aspect of this case was that it was
initially tried in U.S. federal courts and then later before the WTO but under domestic
law and not the TRIPS Agreement. 215 Although the TRIPS Agreement, Articles 22-23
address GIs, the WTO applied U.S. domestic law. The case involved two companies,
Havana Rum & Liquors, a Cuban Corporation, and Pernod Recard, S.A., a French com-
pany. Together they entered into a joint venture to internationally distribute the Cuban
company's product, Havana Rum. The trademark was registered with the Cuban com-
pany in Cuba in 1972 and later with the U.S. Patent Office in 1976, but it was assigned to
the holding company, Havana Club Holding (HCH), which the joint venture created to
distribute the Havana Rum.
209. Lina Mont6n, Geographical Indications of Origin : Should They Be Protected and Why? - An Analysis of the
Issue from the U.S. and E.U. Perspectives, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L. J. 315, 334 (20Q6).
210. Marietta Cauchi, This Ruling's For Bud, 3 IP L. & Bus. 4 (Apr. 2005).
211. Id.
212. Havana Club Holding, S.A. v. Galleon S.A., 203 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 2000).
213. Graham, supra note 98, at 11.
214. Id.
215. Id.
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Before these two companies' joint venture, a Cuban family named Arechabala owned
the Havana Club trademark in the United States, and in April 1997, Bacardi & Co. pur-
chased these rights from the family.?16 Bacardi started selling a line of this rum under that
trademark in the United States, which resulted in HCH suing Bacardi for trademark in-
fringement.2 17 The suit ended up falling under domestic law. HCH's argument was that
the trademark was actually a GI, which, from the use of Havana Club name and the pic-
ture of the Cuban harbor on the label, clearly was meant to indicate it was produced in
Cuba. 218 The District Court threw out this argument, holding that HCH lack standing
due to the present Cuban embargo. 219 Under a later appeal, the Court of Appeals held
that a case under U.S. law would require some legal assignment to be shown. The Second
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld Bacardi's right to use the trademark in the United
States. 220
The WTO addressed whether or not this case fell under the TRIPS Agreement, but it
determined that it did not because the VTO felt it actually concerned trade names in-
stead of GIs.221 However, had this case been addressed under the TRIPS Agreement as a
GI, it would not have fallen under the Article 24 exception because the label of Havana
Club did not begin until 1995. The Article 24 exception allows companies to continue
using their GIs if the country of origin had not already protected the name when the
TRIPS Agreement became effective in 1995.222
This case also illustrates the importance of whether a trademark is actually viewed and
protected as a GI. Arguable, if it had been, the name would not have been protected
because it would not have fallen under Article 24's exception.
B. WHY DOES THE EU WANTr EXTENSIVE PRoTECTION AND THE US DOES NOT?
The EC, representing the "old world," has extensive array of products commonly asso-
ciated with regional origins while the United States has comparatively few. 223 The EU
declared proposals to make all generic region names in the United States registered GIs in
Europe, preventing U.S. corporations from using these product names in the European
system and attempting to regain world market share. Examples of products affected
would have been parmesan cheese, feta cheese, and bologna meat.
IIn the [United States] and many other countries populated by European immigrants,
many food names that "Old World" Europeans consider tied to specific regions have
been used for quite some time for food made in the "New World." Those labels are
now often used to refer simply to styles of foods rather than the specific place of
origin of that product. Most [U.S.] consumers do not usually expect the name of the
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Havana Club Holding S.A. v. Galleon, S.A., 62 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1096 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
219. Id. at 1099.
220. Havana Club Holding, 203 F.3d at 122.
221. Graham, supra note 98.
222. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade: Multilateral Trade Negotiations Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay
Round of Trade Negotiations, Annex IC, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1197 (1994).
223. Lecture Notes taken 23 February 2005.
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food to tell them where the food is from, and thus are not fooled by many labels that
Europeans might consider misleading. This cultural difference has not prevented
Europeans from wanting to protect [U.S.] consumers from themselves.22 4
The United States is particularly concerned because the EC is a very high cost agricul-
tural producer; therefore, it might try to use geographical protections in order to foreclose
the U.S. producers from marketing around the world. The EC wants to economically
protect itself and its agricultural markets. Once the EC has to compete head to head with
other countries, in regards to production costs, it wants to keep in the game. The EC
argues that their farmers either need subsidies or greater geographical indication protec-
tion to survive.225 The EC accuses others of "free-riding on the reputation of European-
quality products." 226 By requiring such stringent standards, essentially eliminating several
large U.S. brand names from competing in the EU, the EC hopes to remain globally
competitive.
Three basic arguments exist to grant the EU the right to protect its Old World names,
which this paper will outline, followed by counter arguments that will show why the U.S.
position is better. The three arguments are (1) the free-rider problem, (2) that consumers
may be misled, and (3) any form of "corrective" is insufficient to counteract the free-rider
problem. 227
The free-rider problem is that producers who make products in a designated region
deserve to protect their products from others using the region's name but that do not
actually originate from the specified region. They feel they have a right to protect their
GIs because "the products they produce "'have unique features that are the result of their
GI' and because they were 'developed at the cost of considerable investment and following
a long tradition."225 Once the original product hits the market and becomes successful,
other competitors will then enter. They will presumably use the same GI but actually
produce their products in a different region, thereby free riding off the value of the origi-
nal products and "trying to pass their products as being of the same quality as the
original." 229
The EU also argues that consumers will be misled. The consumers will believe they are
actually purchasing products derived from the indicated region, with its associated quality
and reputation. This helps consumers distinguish, amongst the options, which to buy.
Therefore, if free-riding on a good's reputation is allowed and the reputation of the
GI is damaged, then consumers may be willing to pay less for the quality good that
originally bore the GI. This will in turn lead to losses to the original producers will
consequently "under-invest." In contrast, if free-riding is not allowed, producers
224. Harry Niska, The European Union Trips over the U.S. Constitution: Can the First Amendment Save the
Bologna that has a First Name?, 13 MiNN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 413, 415-416 (Summer 2004).
225. Id. at 416 (citing Protecting Names, THE ECONOMisT, Aug. 2, 2003, at 49; Stein, supra note 6; Bruce
Stokes, Protecting French Cheese and Italian Prosciutto, NAT'L J., Aug. 9, 2003, at 2556; European Union,
Intellectual Property: Why do Geographical Indications Matter to Us?, available at http://europa.eu.int/
comm/trade/issues/sectoral/intell-property/arguen.htm (uly 30, 2003).
226. Id. (citing James Cox, What's in a Name?, USA TODAY, Sept. 9, 2003, at 1B).
227. Montdn, supra note 210, at 334-336.
228. Id. (citing Alexandra Grazioli, The Protection of Geographical Indications, 6(1) Bridges 15 (2002)).
229. Montin, supra note 210, at 335.
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with a reputation for producing high quality products will more likely continue to
invest in upgrading their products to remain competitive, meaning that GI protection
will encourage innovation.2 30
Finally, the EU feels that using correctives insufficiently addresses the free-rider issue.
A corrective is a statement placed on the label which clearly states that, despite the prod-
uct's name, the good does not originate from the referenced region. They argue that this
is not enough to clarify to the consumer that the quality is different than those coming
from the original region and that it may create a risk of the product name becoming
generic.23'
- The U.S. counter-argument, which this paper adopts, utilizes a balancing test to
determine that despite the potential for free-riding, the costs of adhering to the
EU's request outweighs the cost of changing a system over 200 years old.
- The reason the U.S. view directly conflicts with that of Europe is the same reason
other New World countries, such as Canada and Latin America, support the U.S.
position. As many immigrants left Europe, they took with them their products
and associated geographical names of places they were familiar with in their home
countries. Therefore, the "idea is disconcerting for many American companies
because many of the products they produce have names that were originally taken
from place names in Europe." 232 Such names have become generic and not in-
dicators of a certain region or origin.
In 2003, Tyler Cabot of the Washington Post quoted Sarah Thorn, Director of interna-
tional trade for the Grocery Association of America, as supporting this idea. She states,
"Is it fair to claim after hundreds of years of fair use that these are 'my products'? ...
Nobody thinks of Dijon mustard as ... coming from Dijon, France. No, it is a type of
mustard." 233 She even believes that the U.S. companies have increased the demand for and
value of the original products, countering the EU's free-riding argument of reducing the
original products' value. Cabot also quoted her as saying, "The only reason we now want
Parmesan cheese is because [American] companies have made it, produced it, advertised it
and distributed it. It doesn't matter if you protect some rock in the middle of France, if
nobody knows what the value of it is."234
The United States can continue to use these names legally, under the TRIPS Agree-
ment Article 24, which grants exceptions to names found generic. In the United States
many of these names are already generic. Asking American companies to rename and re-
label all of their products would be extremely costly, but it would also create even more
consumer confusion than what the EU claims the free-riding problem already creates.
Regulation 2081/92 would require reciprocity in order for American products to utilize
the GI system created under this regulation, which would then mean re-labeling their
230. Id. at 335-336.
231. Id. at 336.
232. Id.
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products, renaming them, etc., in order to comply and no longer use any potential GI
names on U.S. products.
American companies spend enormous amounts of money on their yearly marketing,
which supports that their brand names are valuable and assist in increasing their profits.
Changing names not only requires a complete overhaul with labeling but also removing all
current marketing materials. VIPO states that, "customers also choose a product because
its brand name seems to represent a way of life or a set of ideas."235
A perfect example is Kraft, who manufactures and sells parmesan cheese, which gets its
name from an Italian product.236 The current strict EU laws have already prevented Kraft
from continuing to sell in the EU its parmesan product under that name, as it had been
doing since 1965.237 Instead, it had to rename its product to Pamessello. The Kraft
Foods Cheese Division Vice President believes that this will end up in profits losses as it
"has the risk of alienating our consumers and losing them. '238 Logically, should compa-
nies have to do the same in the Americas, consumers would be equally confused and possi-
bly switch users.
How does this effect protectionism? Although both sides have protectionist reasons to
assist their own country's businesses succeed, the United States would incur significantly
more costs and lead to significantly more consumer confusion than maintaining the status
quo. As Lina Monttn points out in her 2006 article about GIs, "allowing only certain
products to carry a given geographical indication will unfairly reduce competition and
encourage monopolization, and arguably, sanctioning such monopolies will ultimately
lead to higher prices for consumers for the products that are permitted to maintain that
GI."1239
The EU recognizes the value it has in achieving higher GI protection. If able to exploit
these regional names, it could bolster local industries while still maintaining a more uni-
fied alliance with all its Member States. 240 Although the EU has valid arguments to keep
its original products, if it had succeeded in forcing other countries to protect GIs in its
way, then it would have been effectively free-riding off years and years of American com-
panies' marketing. It would have been violating its own principle of anti-free-riding.
In one study performed by the World Bank, the conclusions revealed that "little system-
atic evidence exists about whether [the U.S. system] may confuse consumers," and pro-
tecting consumers from confusion is the central function of trademarks and GIs.241
However, the authors do distinguish status goods from others and define them as "prod-
ucts for which the mere use or display of a particular label confers prestige on their buy-
ers-regardless of the products quality." 242 In this case, the study does conclude that
using GIs by "non-original producers," although not confusing purchasers may still un-
235. WProrld Intellectual Prop. Org. [WIPO], Intellectual Property: A Power Tool for Economic Growth,
WIPO Pub. 888 at 55 (2003) (prepared by Kamil Idris).
236. Montdn, supra note 209, at 339.
237. Id.
238. Id. (citing James Cox, What's in a Name, USA TODAY, Sept. 9, 2003).
239. Id. at 340.
240. Eva Gut;errez, Geographical Indications: A Unique European Perspective on Intellectual Property, 29 HAS-
rINGS INr'L & Comp. L. REv. 29, 30 (2005).
241. Carsten Fink & Keith Maskus, Trade, Doha, & Development: A Window into the Issues, The Int'l
Bank for Reconstructions & Development/The World Bank, 204(Nov. 2005).
242. Id.
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dermine the status value. 243 In this sense, the EU does have a valid stance. Despite this,
though, the central tenet of protecting GIs, again, lies in consumer confusion and not
status value. Importantly, when it comes to most status goods, such as wine and spirits,
these goods already receive higher protection under TRIPS.
Another study conducted by Stanford University and presented before the Institute for
International Integration Studies in Dublin states, "If the benefit that consumers get from
the exclusive label denoting the region of origin outweighs the cost of providing that
information and/or enforcing the restriction than the GI is putatively justified." 244 The
study goes on further, however, to conclude that it is protectionist should the costs of
protecting fail to exceed the costs of providing information.2 45 The study referred to
Zago and Pick's empirical study conducted in 2004 that determined, in looking at the
impact on welfare of information, that producers of low-quality goods are worse off and
those of high-quality have minimal differences, and, therefore, there is a decrease in
welfare.2 46
What does this conclude? It shows that studies can provide support for both the United
States and the EU. For status goods, such as wines and spirits, protection helps preserve
their status; however, the Zago and Pick study found differences for such high cost goods
minimal, and therefore it can decrease welfare. On the other hand, there is little empirical
evidence suggesting that consumers are, indeed, confused by countries such as the U.S.
long-term use of regional names.
IX. Conclusion
Through their unique historical developments, the United States and the EU created
different trademark and GI protection systems. The EU has specific registrations and
protections addressing only GIs, while the United States relies on a broader trademark
protection. They both offer their own analysis for upholding trademarks and granting
registrations. The differences between handling GIs is the most distinctive and has led to
this VTO debate.
Immigrants left the EU relocating to the United States, bringing with them products
made with the same or similar methods as their "home European countries." Over time,
these geographical names became generic references to types of food. This natural migra-
tion has led to a large battle between these two powerful regions.
Consumers in the United States recognize these generic names as just that; however,
the EU argues it implies that these products actually were developed and processed using
the unique geographical region or method as a geography reference may imply.
The use of these names has been around for years, which is why this paper supports the
U.S. stance. Trying to switch it would lead to greater confusion than the EU alleges
already exists. What would happen if suddenly all the parmesan cheese disappeared from
the supermarkets, except those expensive imported brands? Instead of simplifying con-
243. Id.
244. Tim Josling, "at's in a name? The economics, law and politics of Geographical Indications for foods and
beverages, IRS Discussion Paper No. 109, Freeman-Spogli Institute for Int'l Studies, Stanford Univ.,
presented at Trinity College, Dublin, 4-5 (Nov. 11, 2005).
245. Id.
246. Id. at 5.
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sumer choices, it would cause a great upheaval in American grocery shopping. Americans
would even consider boycotting European products should something such as this occur.
Fortunately, the WTO did recognize the discriminating effects of the EU's Regulation
2081/92 in the section regarding third parties.
Although further empirical studies and analysis on both sides of this Old World-New
World divide are necessary to confirm these conclusions, the time and length constraints
of this paper prevent such. However, these conclusions are supported based primarily on
time; but it is too late to take back those Old World names now.
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